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Abstract 
Recently, the use of crowdsourcing platforms (e.g Amazon Mechanical Turk)  has 
boomed because of their flexible and cost-effective nature, which benefits both the employers 
and workers. However, hiding inside this mutually-beneficial model are malicious tasks, which 
target manipulating search results, leaving fake reviews, etc. Crowdsourced manipulation 
reduces the quality and trustworthiness of online social media, threatening the social values and 
security of the cyberspace as a whole. To help mitigate this problem, we came up with a 
classification model which filters out malicious campaigns from a large number of campaigns 
crawled from several popular crowdsourcing platforms. We then present this blacklist on a 
website, where users can query for malicious campaigns based on the targeted site, task 
description or requesters’ information. Parties adversely affected by malicious campaigns, such 
as targeted websites owners, legitimate workers, owners of the crowdsourcing platforms 
themselves, can use this website as a tool to identify, moderate and eliminate potential malicious 
campaigns from the web.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, we have observed the exponential growth of crowdsourcing use in many 
companies. Crowdsourcing, as defined by CrowdSourcing Week, is “the practice of engaging a 
‘crowd’ or group for a common goal — often innovation, problem solving, or efficiency.” (1) 
According to Spigit’s 2018 State of Crowdsourced Innovation Report, over a third of all 
surveyed companies have been employing different kinds of crowdsourcing software as part of 
their program for more than two years (2). With the rise of online crowdsourcing platforms such 
as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Figure Eight, the practice of appealing to the mass 
for completion of micro-tasks has become easier than ever. People who are sourcing labor to 
finish their tasks can submit task descriptions to these websites, and offer to pay an amount of 
“reward” for each job. These people are known as “requesters”. On the other hand, people who 
do the tasks and receive rewards are called “workers”. Tasks can be as simple as reading a 
shopping receipt, or more complicated such as completing a 45-minute survey for a research.  
Crowdsourcing platforms provide requesters with a low-cost but constantly available 
workforce, mitigating the need to hire fixed-time employees to perform simple tasks. 
Furthermore, as simple as these tasks may be, it is not always feasible to make use of automation 
instead of human labor. For example, to perform a classification task, initial manual labeling is 
needed for training datasets before machine learning models can be applied. Therefore, many 
companies often find themselves in need for cheap human labor to complete these micro-tasks. 
This helps explain the reason crowdsourcing has been gaining much favor among companies. On 
the other side, the ease with which workers can complete micro-tasks and earn money in a short 
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amount of time is the substantial reason for their interest in completing tasks on crowdsourcing 
platforms. While this seems to be an ideal model for both requesters and workers, crowdsourcing 
platforms bring in the risk of being exploited by requesters who request malicious campaigns 
that target at specific sites by manipulating search engines, write fake reviews or create 
manipulated accounts, as found by Lee et al. in his paper ​Detecting Malicious Campaigns in 
Crowdsourcing Platforms (2016)​(3) Additionally, in one of his researches, Wang et al. has found 
that as much as 90% of campaigns posted on two Chinese crowdsourcing platforms are 
malicious (4). As Lee et al. has analyzed in his paper, malicious campaigns have several notable 
characteristics: shorter estimated completion time, along with higher rewards rate, which make 
them more appealing to workers when selecting tasks to complete (3). Also in this paper, he has 
proposed several models to detect and predict malicious campaigns on crowdsourcing websites, 
and has achieved a highest accuracy of 99.2%. 
Our goal in this project is to build upon these findings from Lee et al.’s research to come 
up with other models to ultimately classify malicious campaigns within over 450,000 campaigns 
crawled from several crowdsourcing sites. We build the models using a provided 23,220 rows 
labeled dataset, then run the selected model on the large unlabeled dataset to make predictions on 
malicious campaigns. We subsequently present this blacklist on a website, where users can query 
for malicious campaigns based on the targeted site, task description or requesters’ information. 
The result of this project, the blacklist website, will be a useful tool for website owners, 
especially in the social media area, in detecting malicious attempts targeted at their sites, as well 
as for workers to filter out malicious tasks and find legitimate tasks to complete.   
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2. Background 
This section will explain common terminologies used in this paper, and give an overview 
about the crowdsourcing platform systems and its components, as well as who will benefit from 
this crowdsourcing model. We will then go on to state our purpose, the need for a solution to 
filter out malicious campaigns on crowdsourcing platforms, and what studies have been done 
recently that tackle similar problems. Finally, we will describe the dataset that we would be 
working with throughout this project, from generating classification models to performing 
classification on and retrieving the final blacklist.  
 
2.1 Terminology  
2.1.1 Crowdsourcing  
“Crowdsourcing” is a term first defined by Merriam-Webster in 2006 (5), even though it 
has been in practice for a long period of time by a large number of companies. It is generally 
thought of as the practice of obtaining services or ideas from the work of the community - online 
community in many cases, rather than hiring the traditional long-time and committed employees. 
Many companies and organizations have found great success in taking advantage of 
crowdsourcing. Most notable examples among them include Waze, a large worldwide app that 
allows users to share real-time road conditions, traffic jams and, in turn, gives navigational 
suggestions for users based on the collected data (7)(8). Another company that succeeded in 
employing the crowdsourcing model is Lego, the toy corporation who creates contests for users’ 
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designs of new product ideas, and rewards the creator of the most voted design with 1% of their 
net revenue. This campaign has not only yielded Lego great financial success, but expanded 
Lego’s popularity globally, engaging youths and adults alike as well (8)(9). 
Crowdsourcing has gained its popularity among companies in recent years due to its 
cost-effective nature, quick completion time and the ability to appeal to a large diversity of 
people in different locations. Crowdsourcing is especially useful for employers who have a large 
number of microtasks to be done: tasks that are simple and relatively quick to do, but need 
human inputs and thus cannot be automated. Examples of this include answering to surveys, or 
reading blurry receipts which are not yet auto-detectable by machines. On the other side, 
crowdsourcing also benefits workers who seek to earn extra cash while doing short and simple 
tasks, which require little to no skill or experience. This mutually beneficial model has explained 
the rising popularity of crowdsourcing, and with the rise of online crowdsourcing platforms such 
as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Figure Eight, online crowdsourcing has become 
more ubiquitous than it has ever been. 
  
2.1.2 Components of crowdsourcing platform 
On online crowdsourcing platforms, ​requesters​ are “employers”, companies, merchants, 
etc. who create ​campaigns​, which consist of several smaller tasks. These tasks are typically small 
in scale (microtasks) and may or may not require pre-qualifications to participate. Workers, or 
“employees” are people who, if qualified, work towards completing tasks in one or more 
campaigns. Each task will have an amount of ​rewards​, and if workers’ performance is deemed 
sufficient by the requester, they can earn rewards for each task they completed. 
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 Many requesters have abused this simple model of online crowdsourcing to create 
malicious campaigns. A malicious campaign, as defined by Lee et al., may include manipulating 
search engines, writing fake comments and reviews on online stores, and create dummy accounts 
on social media for further cyber-attacks (3). In other words, malicious campaigns slip 
subjective, manipulated opinions, and misleading information into the web. Inherently, 
crowdsourcing manipulation reduces the quality and trustworthiness of online social media as 
well as search engines, causing political biases, and ultimately threatening the social values and 
security of the cyberspace. 
 
2.2 Related works 
A number of researchers have noticed the rising problem of crowdsourced manipulation 
in the past few years and have generated valuable findings related to the statistics of malicious 
campaigns on the web. In 2012, Wang et al. took the first step in tackling the problem of 
“Sybils” (fake accounts) in social networking websites such as Facebook by developing a 
scalable crowdsourced Sybil detection system (4). On another note, in his 2015 paper 
“Uncovering crowdsourced manipulation of online reviews”​, Fayazi et al. has shown that, 
popular search engines like Google, Bing, as well as social media sites like Facebook, Pinterest, 
or online merchants such as Amazon, all have fallen victim to crowdsourced manipulation 
coming from malicious campaigns on crowdsourcing platforms (6). A more relevant research, in 
his 2016 paper ​“Detecting Malicious Campaigns in Crowdsourcing Platforms”​, Lee et al. has 
proposed a novel approach to define, classify and detect malicious campaigns that exist on 
several popular crowdsourcing platforms (3). In this paper, he first identified the characteristics 
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of malicious campaigns as opposed to legitimate campaigns, and then made use of these 
characteristics (or features) to build a model that classify malicious and legitimate campaigns 
with an accuracy of up to 99.2%. This research will, as approved by the authors, serve as the 
foundation, a starting point and a baseline for our project.  
Recently, in 2018, Su et al. has looked into the problem of crowdturfing “Add to 
Favorites” that occurs within the realm of online shopping. According to the paper, adding to 
favorites is a “popular function in online shopping sites which helps users make a record of 
potentially interesting items for future purchases” (17). Malicious requesters exploit this by 
putting up tasks for workers to add their items to “favorite”. In this way, their products will have 
higher positions in the search ranking lists which will make them more noticeable to shoppers, 
increasing their number of sales.  The authors proposed a factor graph based model to identify 
this kind of malicious crowdsourcing behaviors, which proved to efficiently help detect 
manipulated “Add to Favorites” tasks. 
Several recent papers which target the crowdturfing phenomenon can also be mentioned. 
For example, in ​“Detecting Crowdturfing in Social Media”​ (18), Wu et al. defined the notion of 
“crowdturfing”, which is a combination of “crowdsourcing” and “astroturfing”, and “aims to 
gain or destroy reputation of people, products and other entities through spreading biased 
opinions and framed information” (Wu, 2017).  
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3. Problem statement 
3.1 Motivation 
There are several characteristics of malicious campaigns that make them appealing to 
workers. As investigated by Lee et al., malicious campaigns have higher hourly rewards than 
legitimate ones. This means that workers can, therefore, make more money in the same amount 
of time, which naturally attracts more workers. Furthermore, malicious tasks usually have lower 
expected completion time, meaning they are usually both shorter and simpler to finish compared 
to legitimate ones. Workers can, therefore, earn money in a short amount of time and with an 
ease of mind doing malicious tasks. In an experiment that we conducted on Amazon’s MTurk in 
an attempt to understand workers’ experience on a crowdsourcing platform, we became aware of 
the large gap in the level of commitment required between legitimate and malicious campaigns. 
While some campaigns only ask for simple tasks such as going to some external websites, 
leaving a short review and do not require pre-qualifications to do, a few others require lengthy 
trainings for pre-qualifications (Figure 1), and the tasks are also much more complicated and 
time consuming (filling out a quality research survey, listing out all items in a blurry receipt). 
The rewards are relatively equal for both cases, which inevitably causes a tendency in workers to 
lean towards the shorter and simpler tasks.  
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 Figure 1: Large number of tasks on MTurk require pre-qualifications 
 
Considering the widespread and possibly detrimental consequences of malicious 
campaigns, we found it crucial to come up with a tool to help mitigate the impact they have upon 
targeted websites, workers, and the web ecosystem as a whole. So far, there exists no research or 
product that compiles the findings of malicious campaigns into a comprehensive list where 
affected parties can utilize to moderate the crowdsourcing environment. This has led to our 
development of a malicious campaign blacklist, a mechanism that filters out proven and potential 
malicious campaigns from 450,000 campaigns listed on four popular crowdsourcing sites: 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), Microworkers, Rapidworkers, and Shorttask. We 
subsequently present this blacklist on a website, where users can query for malicious campaigns 
based on the targeted site, task description or requesters’ information. Parties adversely affected 
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by malicious campaigns, such as targeted websites owners, legitimate workers, owners of the 
crowdsourcing platforms themselves, can therefore use this website as a tool to identify, 
moderate and eliminate potential malicious campaigns from the web.  
 
3.1 Dataset 
In this project, we use two datasets. The one used for baseline model development is a 
23,220-row dataset of crowdsourcing campaigns, with legitimate and malicious campaigns 
already labeled. This dataset was crawled from MTurk, Microworkers, Rapidworkers, and 
Shorttask, using a crawler developed by Lee et al. in his aforementioned 2016 research. The 
crawler collected 23,220 campaigns, including detailed campaign descriptions within a period of 
three months between November 2014 and January 2015. Each campaign in the collected dataset 
was manually labeled as malicious or legitimate based on its description. Out of the 23,220 
campaigns, 5,010 campaigns were identified as malicious and the rest were legitimate. In the 
same manner, the large unlabeled 450,000-row dataset was crawled from the four mentioned 
crowdsourcing platforms, in the 20-month period from July 2015 to February 2017 . This would 
be the dataset from which our blacklist for malicious campaigns were pulled out from.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Goals and Objectives 
The goal of this project is to build a classification model that achieves equal or higher 
accuracy compared with the model accuracy achieved in aforementioned Lee et al.’s paper, and 
with this new model, filter out the malicious campaigns within 450,000 campaigns crawled from 
four crowdsourcing sites. The training dataset would be a provided 23,220 rows labeled dataset, 
and true test would be the 450,000 entries unlabeled dataset. We subsequently present this 
blacklist on a website, where users can query for malicious campaigns based on the targeted site, 
task description or requesters’ information. The result of this project, the blacklist website, will 
be a useful tool for website owners, especially in the social media area, in detecting malicious 
attempts targeted at their sites, as well as for workers to filter out malicious tasks and find 
legitimate tasks to complete.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
This section goes into detail on the classification models we developed, the metrics and 
criteria that we used to pick out the best model to run on the large unlabeled dataset. In addition, 
we will talk about the design process of the web application, the technology with which the 
product website was developed, as well as external resources that helped us deploy the final web 
service. Throughout the development process, we receive constant feedbacks from our advisor 
based on his perspective of the product.  
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The high level workflow of our project (as depicted in Figure 2) is as follows: First, we 
used the baseline dataset to develop a classification model. Next, we used this model to predict 
malicious campaigns in the large dataset and save these campaigns in the database. We then 
indexed the malicious campaigns with a search engine library and deployed the search engine 
through a web service. Users can use this web service to search through the malicious campaigns 
within our database. 
 
 
Figure 2: Project high level workflow 
 
4.2.1 Creating classification models 
4.2.1.1 Dataset 
As we have mentioned in the previous sections, the 23,220-row labeled dataset would be 
used as the baseline dataset. For the purpose of creating classification models, this is the only 
dataset we were going to use. We believed the large number of instances in this dataset was 
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sufficient to overcome the problem of overfitting. Therefore, we made use of this dataset to make 
both training and testing sets. We randomly splitted this dataset into a 17,415-row training set 
and the remaining 5,805-row into the testing set, then saved these training and testing sets and 
used across all models for consistency.  
 
4.2.1.2 Features 
As Lee et al. has proposed in his aforementioned paper, the features used for building 
malicious campaign classifiers are “reward, number of tasks, estimated time to complete (ETC), 
hourly wage, number of URLs in task instruction​, , numberNumber of  URLs in task instructionNumber of  words in task instruction  
of words in a task title, number of words in task instruction, and text features extracted from task 
title and task instruction.” With these features, his team was able to develop a model with a high 
accuracy of 99.2%. Therefore, we decided to make use of these features in creating the 
classification models, as well as coming up with other features. However, we found out that 
while all other features were included in the given dataset, the correlation score between the 
campaign and the text features was missing. What was included in the dataset was only a list of 
the text features of all campaigns. As a result, we had to generate the scores ourselves. In order 
to do this, we went through the following steps: 
1. Combine task title and task instruction, remove stopwords and apply stemming 
2. Build a TF-IDF vectorizer with the sklearn library that uses the provided text 
features as its vocabulary and automatically extracts unigram, bigram, trigram 
features from the text 
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3. Generate TF-IDF vectors for each campaign based on its processed title and 
instruction text with the vectorizer 
After the TF-IDF vectors were generated, we combined them with all other proposed 
features to get the final vectors for our model. The entire workflow of the feature extraction 
process can be summarized in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Campaign feature extraction workflow 
 
4.2.1.3 Classification models 
a. Features variations 
Since the TF-IDF vectorizer that we built extracted unigram, bigram, and trigram 
features, word order within a text played a crucial part. To avoid oversight, we decided to use 3 
slightly different feature combinations: 
1. Without the text features to serve as baseline 
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2. Combine the task title with the task detail (in that order) 
3. Combine the task detail with the task title (in that order) 
Each type of model we utilize was run using these 3 sets of features. We then compared 
the performance of all models of all combinations and pick the best performing model to run 
against the unlabeled dataset. 
 
b. Selected models 
Choosing which model to use was an important decision, and we looked into the 
characteristics of several models in order to make our selections. Firstly, as Lee et. al.’s best 
performing model was Support Vector Machine (SVM), we selected SVM as one of our models 
and used its reported performance as our benchmark. Another model chosen to use on the 
baseline database is Decision Tree for its simplicity and easiness to interpret. We also selected 
Random Forest, Gradient Boosting Tree, and Xgboost to make the Decision Tree algorithm more 
powerful.  
 
4.2.1.4 Final model selection 
In order to pick the best performing model, we compared each model’s accuracy score, 
false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR) and area under the receiver operating 
characteristic curve (AUC).  
Accuracy score shows how accurate the model’s prediction is. It is the ratio between the 
number of correct predictions and the total number of predictions. While useful, we cannot 
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confidently choose the best performing model on this metric alone. This is also one of the 
metrics used by Lee et. al.  
FPR and FNR are metrics to measure errors in a model’s results. FPR shows the rate of 
falsely predicting malicious campaigns as legitimate while FNR shows that rate of falsely 
predicting legitimate campaigns as malicious. These metrics would help us pick the model with 
the least error. These metrics are also the remaining 2 metrics of Lee et. al. 
AUC shows how well a model can discriminate between positive and negative classes 
(21). AUC is useful for evaluating binary classification, especially with high bias data (one class 
is much more common than the other) (22). Since the number of malicious campaigns is 
significantly less than the number of legitimate campaigns in both of our dataset, this metric is 
extremely valuable for model evaluation. 
We also used Lee et. al. best performing model as baseline, which is the SVM model 
with 99.2% accuracy, 0.019 FPR and 0.055 FNR.  
 
4.2.2 Creating a web application  
4.2.2.1 Frontend pages 
a. Structure design 
Our first task in creating the frontend UI for the web application was to come up with the 
overall structural design. Since the number of malicious sites to be displayed is relatively large 
(more than 9000 items), it would not make sense to present all of them on the main page. 
Instead, we thought of creating a landing page which includes a search bar for users to put in 
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their search criteria (it could be based on task name, targeted sites, task requesters, etc..). This 
page would only contain a title for the project, a search bar and a navigation bar for users to get  
to other parts of the website. This include links to the “Search”, “Statistics”, “Contact” and 
“About” page. The statistics page displays graphs and charts to inform users about the 
percentage of malicious tasks on crowdsourcing websites, the breakdown of malicious tasks rate 
in each platforms, and the typical pay rate for one malicious campaign, etc…  “About” page 
gives a short description of the project, and “Contact” page provides contact information of this 
project’s team members. 
There are two ways that users can query malicious tasks. They can either fill in the search 
bar on the landing page and click the “See blacklist” button, or go straight to the “Search” page 
on the navigation bar. Either way, once the users fill in the search query (this can be the task 
name, requester, targeted site names, etc...), they will be taken to the search result page. The 
details on this page, along with initial design ideas will be further discussed in the next section. 
 
b. Search results page 
The design for this result page was also a priority for us in developing frontend UI, 
because this page will show the heart of our project: a searchable blacklist for malicious tasks. 
 We initially intended to display the blacklist in a table format, with each column as a 
field of the task (targeted site, task title, campaign link, etc.), and within each column there will 
be an option to sort the rows based on this criterion (Figure. 4). However, we found this table 
format extremely ineffective at showing large amount of text (Most task description and detail 
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are longer than the cell space). Moreover, based on our advisor’s feedback, we also agreed that 
this format was too plain, outdated and would not attract the wanted attention of users.  
 
Figure 4: Initial design for search results page is in a table format 
 
In an effort to make the page more modern and more appealing to users, we decided to 
study other websites. We wanted to learn from websites that were well-known, had a modern 
design, able display large amount of text and easy to navigate. We found that job searching sites 
matched all of our requirements. As a result, we decided to look at 3 popular job searching sites: 
Google Careers (Figure 5), Monster (Figure 6) and Glassdoor (Figure 7). Interestingly, these 3 
sites had almost identical design format: a search bar at the top, an option bar that offered 
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capabilities such as filter and sort, a list of jobs in the small left panel, and information on the 
selected job in the large right panel. We decided to base our final design on this format. 
 
 
Figure 5: Google Careers web page 
 
 
Figure 6: Monster web page 
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 Figure 7: Glassdoor web page 
 
Our advisor also suggested adding some statistics of the current query, such as the total 
number of results associated with the query or the distribution of targeted sites of all results. We 
decided to include both of these information in our search page final design.  
The final search page design is portrayed in Figure 8. The site has a navigation bar at the 
top to allow users to navigate to other pages of the website. Next is an option bar that contains a 
filtering option button, sorting option button, a search bar, and the number of results associated 
with the current query. The page has 3 main panels. The left-hand panel contains a list of 
malicious tasks. 20 task are shown at a time in the list to avoid crowding the page and to improve 
page load time (by avoiding loading too many campaigns at the same time). Users can navigate 
the malicious task list with the page number navigator below the list. When a user chooses an 
item from this list, the details of the malicious task would appear on the central panel. The 
right-hand panel will display some statistics related to this particular task. This design template is 
employed by a number of websites because of its simplicity yet effectiveness.  
26 
  
Figure 8: Final version design of search results page 
 
4.2.2.2 Backend components 
a. Web application framework 
The first critical design decision to be made for our web application was the backend 
framework. There are a number of factors we needed to take into consideration to choose an 
appropriate backend framework. Firstly, since we are using Python for developing models, and 
the website is going to be the interface to present the results, we would prefer a framework that 
uses Python in order to mitigate the possibility of confusion when switching between different 
programming languages in the same project. Secondly, as this web service is going to fetch and 
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present data from the database, separation of concern became a priority, and so a 
well-established Model-View-Controller framework would be desired. Another important point 
to keep in mind is security. Like all other web applications that use private data and is going to 
be deployed to the public, security is one of the key criteria that the potential framework has to 
satisfy. Last but not least, since this is an ongoing effort to tackle harmful influences on the web 
ecosystem in general, and malicious campaigns on crowdsourcing sites in particular, it is our 
vision that this project is going to be continued and expanded in the future. Therefore, scalability 
is another aspect that would be nice for the framework to have. 
With all the aforementioned concerns in mind, we decided to choose Django as our 
backend framework. Django is a popular Python-based backend web application framework 
which follows the model-view-template (MVT) architectural pattern (11). Some notable sites 
that use Django include Disqus, Instagram, and Mozilla (14). Django includes an 
object-relational mapper (or ORM) that arbitrates the data models (which are defined as Python 
classes) and the database (the "Model").  The “View” component is the Python callback function 
for a particular URL, and a template system for the user interface (the "Template"). Django is 
well-known for its emphasis on making sure that developers can avoid most common mistakes 
related to security. These common mistakes include SQL injection, cross-site request forgery 
(CSRF), clickjacking and cross-site scripting (XSS) (13). By using a strong user authentication 
system, Django reduces significantly security risks. Furthermore, by employing a 
separation-of-concerns method, Django projects are highly scalable. This means that developers 
can add hardwares, middlewares or caching servers at any point and still make sure the project is 
not corrupted. 
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b. Database management system 
Since the data that we would use for training and testing were stored in SQL tables, we 
decided to use MySQL for database management. Today, MySQL is the world’s largest open 
source relational database management system (RDBMS), indicating its maturity and availability 
for failure support (15). It also has the advantage of compatibility, as it runs on virtually all 
platforms, including Linux, Mac OS, Windows,... (16) This is important for our project in such a 
way that we would be using different operating systems in the development and deployment 
process. Details for the project deployment will be explained further in section 3.2.2.3.  
 
c. Search engine 
One of the main features of our web service is the search function. This is where users 
put in a search criterion and it will be used to filter out relevant malicious tasks. We used Django 
Haystack library as our search engine for its numerous advantages. First of all, as we had 
previously decided to use Django as the backend framework, we were leaning towards using a 
Django supported search engine. This would make the installation and usage of the search engine 
much easier and faster than any other searching modulars. Secondly, Django Haystack is a 
reusable app and relies only on its own code. This makes it work nicely with both first-party and 
third-party apps without requiring us to modify existing code (19). Furthermore, it has a large 
and active user and contributor community, which is extremely helpful for us in case we are 
stuck or have questions during installation and development. 
Finally, Django Haystack is extremely flexible and supports some of the most popular 
search backends (Elasticsearch, Solr, Whoosh, etc...) The backend is also pluggable, meaning the 
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developer can change the search backend with minimal code changes. Initially, we opted for 
Elasticsearch as our search backend because of its performance, popularity, and scalability (20). 
However, we were not able to fully implement this backend. As a result, we switched to 
Whoosh, which is much simpler but less powerful.  
 
4.2.2.3 Server machine 
In the production process of the project, we needed a virtual machine to host the MySQL 
database, as mentioned above, and the final product - the website which would utilize this 
database and run machine learning models in the backend. Furthermore, with a view for this 
project to continue in the coming years, we preferred to set up a long-term infrastructure. After 
discussions with the resources team at WPI, we were given a basic centOS 7 virtual machine so 
that we could install various pieces as desired. We first set up the database management tool on 
the machine so that the web service could get access to it later. We then created a virtual 
environment with all the Python dependencies installed so as to avoid the scenario of confusions 
between different versions of packages. Inside this virtual environment, we put our Django 
project and manage it through a version control system - Git. Three users (members of this team 
and the instructor) have access to this machine. The last step in production of the web application 
is to publish the website by starting up the server inside this virtual machine. The URL for the 
website is ​blacklist.wpi.edu  
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5. Results 
5.1 Models 
As discussed in 3.2.2.4, we compared all models using Accuracy, FPR, FNR and AUC. 
We would also compare our models with Lee et. al. best performing model, which is the SVM 
model with 99.2% accuracy, 0.019 FPR and 0.055 FNR.  
The first feature combination contains all proposed features except for the text features. 
This combination result is summarized in Table 1. All models with this feature combination 
perform worse than the baseline model in all metrics, with only the SVM has better FNR. In fact, 
this is the best FNR out of all models of all combinations.  
 
Model Accuracy FPR FNR AUC 
SVM 0.9080 0.4152 0.0022 0.7913 
Decision Tree 0.9842 0.0372 0.0099 0.9764 
Random Forest 0.9869 0.0333 0.0075 0.9796 
Gradient 
Boosting 
0.9804 0.0658 0.0068 0.9637 
Xgboost 0.9805 0.0642 0.0070 0.9644 
Table 1: Result of Feature Combination 1: No text feature 
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The second feature combination contains all proposed features, with the text features 
generated by combining the task title before the task detail. This combination result is 
summarized in Table 2. While the SVM and the Decision Tree in general perform worse than the 
baseline, the Random Forest, Gradient Boosting and Xgboost perform better than the baseline in 
2 or more metrics.  
 
Model Accuracy FPR FNR AUC 
SVM 0.9686 0.1038 0.0112 0.9425 
Decision Tree 0.9914 0.0214 0.0051 0.9868 
Random Forest 0.9922 0.0174 0.0051 0.9888 
Gradient 
Boosting 
0.9921 0.0238 0.0035 0.9864 
Xgboost 0.9922 0.0254 0.0029 0.9859 
Table 2: Result of Feature Combination 2: Text feature taskTitle + taskDetail 
 
The third feature combination contains all proposed features, with the text features 
generated by combining the task detail before the task title. This combination result is 
summarized in Table 3. Similar to Feature Combination 2, while the SVM and the Decision Tree 
in general perform worse than the baseline, the Random Forest, Gradient Boosting and Xgboost 
perform better than the baseline in 2 or more metrics. 
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Model Accuracy FPR FNR AUC 
SVM 0.9686 0.1038 0.0112 0.9425 
Decision Tree 0.9912 0.0206 0.0055 0.9869 
Random Forest 0.9940 0.0158 0.0033 0.9904 
Gradient 
Boosting 
0.9920 0.0246 0.0035 0.9860 
Xgboost 0.9922 0.0254 0.0029 0.9859 
Table 3: Result of Feature Combination 3: Text feature taskDetail + taskFeature 
 
Overall, the Random Forest model of Combination 3 has the best accuracy, FPR and 
AUC and second best for FNR (with 0.0011 difference of the best FNR). It also outperformed 
the baseline in all 3 metrics. Based on these comparisons, we considered this to be the best 
performing model and selected this as the model to predict the labels for the large dataset.  
 
5.2 Website 
As discussed in the previous section 3.2.2.1, after several design sketches, we have 
decided to keep an easy-to-navigate overall structure of the web page, which has a landing page 
as the main page, and from there users can get other pages on the navigation bar. This web 
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service was deployed to a CentOS 7 virtual machine, provided to us by the WPI’s Academic 
Resources Center (ARC). The address for our website is “blacklist.wpi.edu”.  
For the search result page, the average query time that users have to wait before the page 
fully loads is about 7 seconds, which was longer than our expectation. This is partially due to the 
Highcharts query statistics graph being generated at runtime 
Below are some snapshots of final version of the website.  
 
 
Figure 9: Landing page  
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 Figure 10: Search result page 
 
 
Figure 11: Statistics page 
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6. Conclusion and Future works  
6.1 Conclusion 
In this project, we have developed a model which labels malicious campaigns based on a 
labeled 23,220-campaigns dataset. This was a Random Forest model, performing spectacularly 
on the baseline dataset with an accuracy of 99.4% and FPR of only 1.8%. This model was used 
to perform classification on the large, unlabeled nearly 450,000 campaigns database, which were 
crawled from several popular crowdsourcing platforms. It identified over 5000 malicious 
campaigns, which made our final blacklist.  
We then went on to create a web service to present this blacklist, where users can query 
for malicious campaigns based on the targeted site, task description or requesters’ information. 
This web service uses Django as the backend framework, which promotes separation of 
concerns, security and scalability. The database management system of our choice was MySQL 
for its compatibility with our provided datasets, ease of use and popularity. Django Haystack was 
the search modular used for the searching functionality for its compatibility with Django, our 
choice of backend framework. This web service was deployed to a server machine provided to us 
by the WPI’s Academic Resources Center. The address for our website is “blacklist.wpi.edu”.  
Instructions on how to set up the server and running the website can be found in 
Appendix A. Likewise, all the Python packages that needs to be installed in order to run the 
scripts and replicate our development process is included in Appendix B.  
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6.2 Future works 
In this project, the blacklist was generated only from the dataset provided by our advisor, 
which was collected in 3 months between November 2014 and January 2015 (3). In order to 
populate the database with more recent malicious campaigns, future researchers should develop a 
crawler to crawl crowdsourcing websites for new campaigns, use a classification model to 
predict the labels of these new campaigns, add the newly predicted malicious campaigns to the 
database, and index them with the site’s search engine. Ideally these actions should be 
automatically performed at least once per day to keep the database up-to-date. 
The current search engine backend is Whoosh. While it is sufficient for now, this 
backend is not optimal for scaling and performing more complicated tasks such as faceting. 
Future researchers should replace this backend with a more powerful one such as Elasticsearch 
or Solr. 
Currently the runtime of the search page is slow (approximately 7 seconds for 1 query). 
This runtime can be improved by using a more powerful backend engine and running the server 
on a more powerful infrastructure. 
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Appendix A 
Below lists the steps to start up the server and web service: 
I. SET UP SERVER 
1. Open SSH connection to the server blacklist.wpi.edu, port 22 
2. Log in with your credentials 
3. Go to /opt/TaskBlacklistMQP_1819 
4. Activate virtual environment  
5. Go to blacklist/ 
6. Run sh runserver.sh 
The website should now be up and running on server 
II. ACCESS THE WEBSITE 
Open any browser, go to blacklist.wpi.edu:8000  
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Appendix B 
Below lists the packages that were installed inside our virtual environment: 
pip                       18.1 
backcall                  0.1.0  
bleach                    3.1.0  
construct                 2.5.3  
decorator                 4.3.2  
defusedxml                0.5.0  
Django                    2.1.5  
django-connections        0.1  
django-haystack           2.8.1  
entrypoints               0.3  
future                    0.17.1  
ipykernel                 5.1.0  
ipython                   7.3.0  
ipython-genutils          0.2.0  
ipywidgets                7.4.2  
jedi                      0.13.2  
Jinja2                    2.10  
joblib                    0.13.2  
jsonschema                2.6.0  
jupyter                   1.0.0  
jupyter-client            5.2.4  
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jupyter-console           6.0.0  
jupyter-core              4.4.0  
MarkupSafe                1.1.0  
mistune                   0.8.4  
mysql                     0.0.2  
mysql-connector-python-rf 2.2.2  
mysqlclient               1.3.14  
nbconvert                 5.4.1  
nbformat                  4.4.0  
nltk                      3.4  
notebook                  5.7.4  
numpy                     1.16.1  
pandas                    0.24.1  
pandocfilters             1.4.2  
parso                     0.3.4  
pefile                    2018.8.8 
pexpect                   4.6.0  
pickleshare               0.7.5  
prometheus-client         0.6.0  
prompt-toolkit            2.0.9  
ptyprocess                0.6.0  
Pygments                  2.3.1  
PyMySQL                   0.9.3  
python-dateutil           2.8.0  
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python-dotenv             0.10.1  
python-ptrace             0.9.3  
pytz                      2018.9  
pyzmq                     18.0.0  
qtconsole                 4.4.3  
runipy                    0.1.5  
scikit-learn              0.20.2  
scipy                     1.2.1  
Send2Trash                1.5.0  
setuptools                40.8.0  
singledispatch            3.4.0.3  
six                       1.12.0  
sklearn                   0.0  
SQLAlchemy                1.2.18  
terminado                 0.8.1  
testpath                  0.4.2  
tornado                   5.1.1  
traitlets                 4.3.2  
wcwidth                   0.1.7  
webencodings              0.5.1  
wheel                     0.33.1  
Whoosh                    2.7.4  
widgetsnbextension        3.4.2   
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